Why tulip revolution

Akayev seems certain to be refused foreign assistance in any attempted restoration of power. From the point of view of Kazak, Uzbek and Tajik rulers, no good can come out of the situation in this border state. Democratic rule in Kyrgyzstan would put their authoritarian regimes at risk, and these men have all been reluctant--to varying degrees to be sure--to support the development of democratic institutions in their countries.

But if the situation in Kyrgyzstan fails to stabilize, the fears of these men could be warranted. Violence in one Central Asian state has inevitable repercussions throughout the region. All remember how long it took to resolve the civil war in Tajikistan from to and, though few like to admit it, the genesis of that conflict was a struggle for power among competing elite groups.

The current danger in Kyrgyzstan comes not from its masses. It comes from a fractious and potentially greedy elite. The solution in Kyrgyzstan is clear: the ousted president should formerly resign, clearing the way for presidential elections and the eventual restaging of the flawed parliamentary elections.

Obviously there must be an interlude to allow people to catch their breath and discuss how power will be shared among the various governing bodies. But the next set of elections must be free, fair and held in a timely enough fashion to convince the population that they have not been short-changed. Otherwise there is the risk that they will once again take to the streets in protest. These efforts must reach down into the most remote communities, accomplished through aid grants, not loans to an already debt-stricken nation.

Many believe that the Tulip Revolution was a significant turning point for Kyrgyzstan as this led to the end of the corrupt and intolerant reign of President Akayev.

It also set an example to other Asian governments who thought that their governments were not ready for democracy. From this revolution, we learn that lack of transparency and fairness in a state causes unrest. Democracy is, therefore, essential for a government's stability. Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. Former and now acting foreign minister Roza Otunbayeva was one of those barred from running. She returned to the country in , from a U. Political independents and opposition figures were targeted for defeat, and most of the reports of vote buying came from their districts.

A half dozen opposition figures, though, received a majority of votes during the first round of balloting; and in all only a third of the 75 seats were filled at this time. But the Akayev machine refused to rest easy, and even more effort was put into defeating opposition candidates than previously. Two key opposition figures -- Adakhan Madamarov and Kurmanbek Bakiev -- who were expected to be easily reelected, went down to defeat in the second round, each charging fraud.

The defeat of Bakiev in particular seems to have been a turning point. After his defeat Bakiev threw his support behind the United Opposition, who then sought to wrest control of the southern half of the country from Akayev, a goal they achieved in only a few days. But when Akayev fled they were only too happy to pick up the pieces, and assume authority.

Askar Akayev, like his colleagues throughout the region, introduced political institutions that were intended to create an illusion of political participation. They were designed to assuage foreign and domestic critics and not to facilitate the sharing of power by the president and his entourage with other groups in society. But over time the Kyrgyz population and the opposition elite learned to anticipate his behavior, and in March , they simply outsmarted him.

Akayev brought little honor to himself in the way he retreated. He swore in the newly elected parliament, after he had already lost control of the southern half of the country, and then took back his hastily offered resignation as president once he reached safety outside the country.

To his credit though, Askar Akayev did learn one thing from the events in Aksy, that firing on an unarmed crowd could lead to civil war, and for all his unwillingness to resign, he choose to draw the line at that.

The political elite in Kyrgyztan is a fractious group, which has yet to demonstrate whether it is democratic or as potentially corrupt as the outgoing office-holders. If the latter proves to be true, the population may decide that they have been shortchanged and once again take to the streets in protest.

They looked to Georgia and Ukraine and --with the distance and some idealization--saw them as much more fundamental and revolutionary than what went on in their own country, when a group of politicians quite familiar to them began dividing power in what many saw as all too familiar ways. But it is not too late for these young people to have at least some of their idealism restored. Like Ukraine and Georgia, one faction of a divided political elite took over from another.

But unlike Georgia, power was not transferred from one generation to another. Kurmanbek Bakiev, the acting president is only a few years younger than Askar Akayev, as is his principal rival former vice-president Feliks Kulov. But it still remains to be seen whether the domestic politics that they pursue will closely resemble that of the Akayev regime. The key now is for the interim authorities to develop public confidence, and to maintain it through the presidential elections.

This means concentrating on good government, rather than a division of the spoils. Looked at coldly it is sometimes hard to believe that the running interim government is primarily preoccupied with finding the most qualified person for each job, or keeping talented senior officials and experts in place.

It seems instead, that parallel with trying to keep things afloat, there is a desire to reward every major opposition figure with a prominent position to compensate them for their years of sacrifice. One wonders, too, how much of the division of jobs is being made with an eye to building alliances in the upcoming presidential election.

Many observers have always used the clan structure of the Kyrgyz people as the explanation for all that was bad in Kyrgyz political life. But the perpetuation of patrilineal based kin-groups simply helps give shape to the patronage networks which have become more pervasive since independence. In small countries like Kyrgyzstan, elites sometimes believe that stability can be maintained if all the major interestsor patronage groupsare given a continuing stake in the political system.

But as this was occurring the country was growing more complex as well. While they may be happy to benefit from preferential treatment and trade support and funding of campaigns for it, when choices begin to be made among them, those who fall from favor will once again be pressing for a level playing field in the economy.

For this reason it is really incumbent upon the new Kyrgyz leadership to concentrate on rebuilding public confidence through insuring that the upcoming presidential election meet international norms of competitiveness and the conduct of the balloting be both free and fair.

Having never had an election that fully complied with democratic norms this will really be an ambitious task for the Kyrgyz government to organize in under three months. Yet there is very little wiggle room available to them to get it wrong. Moreover, following the presidential election, the newly elected president should further legitimate his or her authority by sponsoring a national dialogue to solicit opinions on what key groups in society see as necessary constitutional changes.

The debate should culminate in a referendum followed by pre-term elections. Methods in 2nd segment. Methods in 3rd segment. Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance. Methods in 4th segment. Methods in 5th segment. Nonviolent occupation. Methods in 6th segment. Boycott of legislative bodies. Nonviolent invasion. Additional methods Timing Unknown. Displays of flags and symbolic colors.

Segment Length. Leaders, partners, allies, elites. External allies. Involvement of social elites. The State Secretary Osmunkun Ibraimov resigned in protest of Ayakev's refusal to negotiate with protesters. Parliamentarians refused to attend Parliamentary meetings in protest. The U. Ambassador and other foreign diplomats criticized the government's use of force against protesters. Opponent, Opponent Responses, and Violence. Nonviolent responses of opponent.